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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Respondent, Robert E. Froerer, adopts the statement of
jurisdiction submitted by Respondent, Attorney's Title Guaranty
Fund Inc.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Respondent, Robert E. Froerer (Froerer), is involved
in only part of the issues that are presented on appeal.

The

issues relating to Froerer were resolved by summary judgment.
The issues on appeal relating to Froerer are as follows:
1.

The Respondent, Froerer, adopts the statement of

issues set forth in Respondent, Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund,
Inc.'s Brief numbered one through four.
2.
Court must

In addition to those issues related above, this
determine whether or not the District Court was

correct in ruling that Combes had no cross-claim against Robert
E. Froerer for malpractice, either as a title abstractor or as an
attorney.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
There are no determinative constitutional provisions.
Respondent relies on the following statutes: 78-12-25, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 (as amended).
Within four years:
(1) an action upon a contract, obligation or
liability not founded upon an instrument in
writing; also on an open account for goods,

wares, and merchandise, and for any article
charged in a store account; also on an open
account for work, labor or services rendered,
or materials furnished; provided, that action
in all of the foregoing cases may be
commenced at any time within four years after
the last charge is made or the last payment
is received.
(2) an action for relief not otherwise provided for by
law
STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS
On August 4, 1986, cross-defendants, Keith and Evelyn
Combe

filed

cross-claims

against

the

defendant,

Robert

E.

Froerer, claiming in their first cause of action negligence as an
attorney and alleging in their second cause of action some claim
for either breach of contract or tort liability.

The allegedly

negligence acts occurred, if they occurred at all, in 1979.

All

of the issues between Appellants and Froerer were decided by
summary

judgment.

(R.912).

The

material

undisputed

facts

considered by the Court at the time of the motions for summary
judgment were taken from the pleadings and from the deposition
testimony of Keith B. Combe, Robert E. Froerer, and Steve Keil.
The statement of facts set forth in Appellants' brief
are not particularly relevant to Robert Froerer as it for the
most part contains facts brought out at trial.
participate
claims

Froerer did not

in the trial, as the trial concerned

between

Harrison, Inc.

Combes

and

the

issues and

Plaintiff/Respondent,

Breuer-

Respondent Froerer would therefore request that
2

this Court consider only the facts that were before the trial
court

at the

time

the

summary

judgment was rendered.

The

material undisputed facts are as follows:
1.

Keith and Evelyn Combe were the owners of real

property located in Weber County, State of Utah, which they had
received from the parents of Keith B. Combe in 1962. (R.1411,
Combe Depo., Exhibit 1)
2.

The property was subject to an easement established

by the District Court pursuant to a complaint filed by the Weber
Basin Water Conservatory District for condemnation.
was tried and judgment entered on May 23, 1960.

The lawsuit
The court

awarded damages to the Combes for the value of the property.
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District placed a pipeline through
the property pursuant to their easement.
3.

(R.797, Ex. A ) .

Robert E. Froerer is an attorney at law practicing

in Ogden, Utah.

He is also licensed by the State of Utah to

write policies of title insurance (Froerer, deposition P.3, 16)1
4.

Sometime in 1979, Froerer was contacted by Steve

Keil, a real estate salesman, and asked to do certain legal work
in connection with a real estate transaction involving property
in Ogden, Utah, wherein Keith B. Combe and other members of his
1

1418.
1419.

The Froerer deposition is included at the Record at page
The Keil deposition is included in the Record at page
3

family were sellers and Casper J. Breuer and William M. Harrison
(and Steve Keil) were buyers. (Froerer deposition p. 6, Keil
deposition pp.22, 24-25).
5.

Froerer prepared a contract in connection with the

real estate transaction and also prepared other documents and
revisions for the sale.

One of the documents was a real estate

contact between sellers and buyers which was dated December 29,
1979,

and signed by all the parties. (There were some later

amendments to the agreement that are not material.)

(Froerer,

deposition pp. 6, 7, 35, exhibits 19-25).
6.
always

In connection with the documents prepared, Froerer

considered

his

client

to be

Steve Keil, one of the

ultimate purchasers.

(Froerer deposition pp. 5, 6, 38, 39, 43.)

Combe

sure

was

not

even

deposition p. 30).

who

Froerer

represented.

(Combe

Combes had all documents reviewed by their

personal attorney, Paul Kunz (Keil deposition p. 25).

Froerer

was paid out of the proceeds of the sale sometime after the
closing.

The closing occurred on December 29, 1979.

(Froerer

deposition pp. 8, 35).
7.

After the sale had closed on December 29, 1979,

(which by the way occurred outside the presence of Froerer and
without his actual knowledge) Froerer agreed to provide title
insurance on the transaction.

No preliminary title report had
4

been requested by the buyers or sellers.
p.52).

(Froerer deposition

No preliminary title report had ever been issued or

relied upon by any party. In fact, no preliminary title report
was ever in existence.
8.

Combes

acknowledged

that

no preliminary

title

report had been issued and in fact did not even know that Froerer
was going to issue a policy of title insurance until after the
transaction was closed.
9.

(Combe deposition p.139).

A policy of title insurance was eventually issued

by Froerer at the request of buyers on November 14, 1980, more
than ten months after the sale.
issued by Froerer was ATGF.

The underwriter on the policy

The policy of title insurance is

attached as addendum one to ATGF's Respondent's brief.
10.

The policy of title insurance did not make an

exception for the aqueduct easement granted to Weber Basin Water
Conservatory District.

See, addendum to ATGF's Respondent's

brief.
11.

At some later date, the aqueduct easement was

discovered by buyers Breuer-Harrison and an action was commenced
by

them

to

rescind the real estate contract.

(Plaintiffs'

Complaint R-l).
12.

On

May 6, 1986, the court found as a matter of

law on summary judgment that the buyers were entitled to have the
5

contract rescinded because the aqueduct easement constituted a
substantial encumbrance upon the fee title; that the sellers
could not perform their contract of delivering an unencumbered
title to the buyers; and buyers were not required to accept the
defective title.
13.

(R. 509, 521).

In this action, sellers Keith B. Combe and Evelyn

Combe filed cross-claims against Froerer and ATGF in August,
1986,

(R. 563), to seek damages against Froerer based upon his

negligence for breach of duty as an attorney

(first cause of

action): and to seek damages against both Froerer and ATGF based
upon the issuance of a policy of title insurance (second cause of
action).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Froerer's

argument

on

appeal may

be

summarized

as

follows:
1.

Froerer adopts the argument

submitted by ATGF

numbers 1 through 7 on pages 7 and 8 of their Respondent's brief.
2.

Robert E. Froerer was not the attorney representing

the sellers in the transaction, but was representing the buyers
and as such had no duty to protect the interests of the sellers.
3.

The Combes had their own personal attorney, Paul

Kunz, review, modify and approve all documents prepared by Steve
Keil's (Buyers) attorney.
6

4.

Froerer alleged negligence caused no damage to

5.

Combes' claims

Combe.
are barred

by

the

statute of

limitations.
ARGDMENT
INTRODUCTION
The Respondent, Froerer, had two cross-claims filed
against him by Appellant Combes in their amended cross-claim on
the 4th of August, 1986 (R.563).
claim

for

previously

attorney's
filed

The first cause of action was a

negligence.

a cross-claim

Although, the Combes had

against

Froerer

this

amended

cross-claim was the first time the cause of action for attorney
negligence was asserted against Respondent Froerer.

This date

was more than six and half years after the alleged negligence
could have occurred.
The second cause of action (although it is difficult to
determine what type of claim is submitted) is against Froerer and
Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund allegedly under the contract of
insurance that was issued almost a year after the sale of the
property.

The Respondent Froerer herein adopts the argument and

legal reasoning set forth by Respondent Attorney's Title Guaranty
Fund in Points one through four of their Brief.

See, Attorney's

Title Guaranty Fund, Inc.'s Respondent's brief pp. 8-24.
7

The

points and authorities set forth below will specifically deal
with Appellant's first cause of action in their amended crossclaim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The cross-claim of Combes against Froerer were disposed
of by summary judgment.

This Court must therefore analyze the

facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the losing
party. Atlas Corp. v. Cloverus National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229
(Utah, 1987).

The court below determined that based upon the

material undisputed
defendant

Froerer

Procedure

56(c).

facts Combes had no claim against crossas

a matter

In order

of

law. Utah Rules of Civil

for the Combes

to overcome the

undisputed facts, they had to submit evidence that would have
created a genuine issue of fact.

If reasonable minds could not

differ on the facts as presented, then the Court could rule as a
matter of law that the Combes had no claim against Froerer for
attorney negligence.
1967),

Singleton v. Alexander, 431 P.2d 126 (Utah,

FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance Co., 594 P.2d

1332 (Utah, 1979).
There were several reasons asserted by Froerer in the
court below as to why Combes' claim was invalid.

If this Court

can sustain the verdict on any reasoning, the summary judgment

8

should stand-

Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co,, 529 P.2d 806 (Utah,

1974).
In this particular case in order for Combes to sustain
their claim for negligence against Froerer they must show all of
the following:
1.

That Combe retained Froerer as his attorney to

represent his interests in the real estate transaction, and that
Froerer accepted the retention2.

That Froerer breached his duty to Combe by failing

to perform his duty to the standard of care as required by Utah
law.
3.

That

Combe

suffered

some

damage

that

was

proximately caused by the actions of Froerer.
4.

That Combes' claim was filed within the applicable

limitation time period as established by Utah law.
POINT I
FROERER WAS NOT COMBES' ATTORNEY AND THEREFORE HAD NO
DUTY TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS
The
contract.

attorney/client

relationship

is one created by

To establish a contract, there must be evidence of an

offer or a request for legal services or advise by a client and
an acceptance by the attorney.

A meeting of the minds must occur

that establishes the rights and duties of the parties to the
9

contract.

The terms must be concise enough for a court of law to

interpret and enforce.

Connelly v. Wolf, Block, Shorr, & Solis-

Cohen, 463 F.Supp. 914 at Page 919 (E.d. Pa. 1978)

2

In this particular case, Froerer believed himself to
be representing the buyers and therefore should be specifically
looking out for their interests.

If Combe thought otherwise, he

should have put Froerer on notice of his intentions.
Although,

Combes'

attorney

states

repeatedly

that

Combe hired Froerer and that Froerer was Combe's attorney, there
are no facts in the record to support this conclusion.

The

record

and

clearly

shows

that

Steve Keil

requested him to prepare documents.
24-25).

contacted

Froerer

(R.1419, Keil Depo. pp. 22,

The record contains no evidence that Combe went to

Froerer's office and requested his services prior to the closing
of December 29, 1979.

The record also clearly showed that before

Combe would agree to sign any documents, they took them to their

1

Establishing the attorney/client relationship for legal
malpractice action differs from establishing attorney/client
relationship for conflict of interest cases.
In a legal
malpractice action, a client must show more than a mere
divulgence of information to establish the attorney/client
relationship.
In a conflict of interest case even though an
attorney/client relationship may never have been established, cin
attorney may be precluded from representing another client
against the original party who divulged information.
This is
because of the high standard placed upon attorneys under the Code
of Professional Responsibility for Fairness.
Margulies v.
Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah, 1985).
10

personal

attorney,

Paul

Kunz,

who

reviewed

the

modified the documents and approved the documents•

documents,

(R.1419, Keil

Depo. p. 25).
Combe on one occasion stated that he did not even know
who Froerer represented.

(R. 1411, Combe deposition, p. 30).

Combe never denied that his attorney Paul Kunz reviewed the
documents, made modifications, and then approved the documents.
The court therefore ruled as a matter of law that Froerer owed no
duty to Combe.

Combes had the burden to establish that Froerer

was their attorney.

Combes failed to do this by any competent

evidence.
The mere fact that Froerer was paid out of the proceeds
of the sale does not establish attorney/client relationship.

In

this particular case and as in most real estate transactions,
costs were paid out of the proceeds of a sale.

One could argue

that the proceeds for sale were actually paid by the Buyers
since they were the ones who deposited the money for closing.
It is interesting to note that the costs were not paid until
after the purchasers and sellers had obligated themselves under
the contract.
Combe would have this Court believe that since Froerer
prepared some documents that he owed a legal duty to Combes.
That is simply not the fact.

Our adversarial system requires

11

that an attorney prepare documents that will protect his client.
An attorney is not obligated to prepare documents that are to
protect the opposing parties rights to the detriment of his own
client.
Combe had the duty to present evidence to the Court
that

would

raise

a

material

employment of Froerer.
statements

that

Combe

issue

of

fact

concerning

his

Other than his attorney's conclusory
hired

Froerer

no

actual

evidence was

presented which would show a meeting of the minds between Combe
and Froerer.

Therefore, Combe failed to create even a question

of fact upon which reasonable minds could differ and the Court
was correct in dismissing his claim for attorney's malpractice.
POINT II
IF WE ASSUME THAT COMBE IS CORRECT IN STATING THAT FROERER
WAS REPRESENTING BOTH CLIENTS IN THE TRANSACTION THEN
COMBES' CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE FAILS
AS FROERER BREACHED NO DUTY TO COMBE
Combes admit that Froerer was representing Steve Keil,
the real estate agent who was the developers agent and who was or
would shortly become the developers partner.
at P. 32).
that

he

had

(See, Combes' Brief

Combe then further states that Froerer understood
been

hired

by

the Combes

necessary to complete the transaction.
reading of the deposition.

to perform, all work
This is not a correct

Froerer only knew that he was hired

by Steve Keil to complete the work for the transaction.
12

If we

assume that Combe did in fact hire Froerer under specific terms
and obligations, then we must also assume that Combe knew that
Froerer was representing both parties in the transaction.
Froerer agrees with Combes' legal statement that "It is
almost impossible

for an attorney to adequately protect the

interest of both the buyer and the seller in a real estate
transaction."
P.2d

1378

Beal v. Mars Larsen Ranch Corporation, Inc., 586

(Idaho, 1978).

If Froerer was to represent both

parties, whom would he owe the duty to?
protect?

Which party should he

A similar question was raised in the case of Smoot v.

Lund, 13 Utah 2.d

168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962).

In that case,

Richard Smoot brought an action against an attorney, Howard Lund.
He alleged that Lund was his attorney and owed him the duty of
protection by preparing documents that would have protected him
in the transaction.

Smoot alleged that Lund should have included

provisions in the contract that would have protected his interest
over those of Lunds.

The court stated at P. 936:

In a situation such as that found here, where
the attorney had represented a client, but
entered into negotiations with him in which
it was clearly apparent to the later that the
attorney was dealing in his own interests, it
is neither reasonable nor practical to
suppose that the attorney will represent the
client's interest to the entire exclusion of
his own. Nor does the law require it. The
plaintiffs appear to be intelligent, business
people and they were dealing in a very
substantial business transaction.
There is
13

nothing mysterious or inscrutable about this
contract •
They were able to read and
understand it and they do not claim to the
contrary; nor do they allege any concealment
of deception as to its contents.
In this particular case, Combes were experienced in
real estate transactions.

He ran his own business and performed

many of his own legal services.

It would be unrealistic for

Combe to feel that Froerer would represent Combes' interest over
and above Froerer's client, Steve Keil in the preparation of the
documents of this case.

Especially when Combe had his attorney,

Paul Kunzf review and modify the documents before he would sign
them.

Combes presented no evidence to show that he made such

specific requests to Froerer nor did he present any evidence to
show that Froerer was

aware that Froerer was suppose to be

protecting Combes' interest.

In fact, viewing the evidence in

light most favorable to Combe, the evidence could show that
Froerer was nothing more than a scrivener putting together a
contract under the terms that were given to him by his client,
Steve Keil.

Froerer, therefore, had no duty to verify the facts,

question the terms of the contract, or form an opinion as to the
fairness of such terms.

Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d

806, 808 (Utah, 1974).
POINT III
FROERER'S ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE CAUSED NO DAMAGE TO
COMBE AND THEREFORE NO CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENCE CAM
BE MAINTAINED
The facts are uncontroverted that Combes were owners
of the property since 1962. They had received it from Phillip C.
14

Combe and Verla M. Combe, the parents of Keith B. Combe.
1416, Exhibits 1 to Keith Combe's depo.)

(See, R

The Combes had owned

the property up to the time of the transaction in December, 1979.
The Combes had tried to sell the property on several occasions
and in fact had sold it at least one time before. (See, R.1416,
Exhibit 6 to Combe's depo.)
A final judgment of condemnation had been entered by
the Honorable Charles G. Cowley on the 23rd day of May, 1960, and
was duly recorded in book 648, page 353, at the Clerk's office.
(See, R.1416, Exhibit
characteristics

of

the

32

to

Combe's

property

were

depo.).
the

The physical

same

before

the

transaction as it was when the court ordered recision of the
contract and the property was returned to the Combes.

The facts

are uncontroverted that no action of the defendant Froerer, no
action of the defendant Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund, and no
action of the plaintiff Breuer-Harrison caused the easement to
come upon the property in question.

In fact, the easement had

always been in existence throughout the whole time the Combes
owned and attempted to sell the property.

In other words, the

Combes received back exactly what they had before the transaction
was entered into.
It is a well settled principal of law that if a party
suffers

no damages

as

a result of negligent
15

actions of an

attorney no claim of malpractice can be maintained.

Dunn v.

McKay, Burton, McMurrav and Thurman, 584 P.2d 894 at 896 (Utah,
1978), Smoot v. Lund, 369 P.2d 933 at 936 (Utah, 1962).
Combe argues that because he cannot sell the property
for what he sold it to plaintiff, Breuer-Harrison, that he is
damaged by the difference in value.

Combe fails to recognize

that the reason the contract was rescinded by Judge Hyde in the
first place is that the value of the property was originally
i.e.

determined by buyer and seller based upon a mistake of fact,
no

easements

or

encumbrances.

Combes

therefore must fail as a matter of law.

argument

for damages

Whatever the value of

the property was, Combe still had the same property in its same
condition and therefore cannot claim that any acts of defendant
Froerer caused the property to loose value.

Since no damages

could be established by Combe, the trial court was correct in
ruling as a matter of law that he had no claim against attorney
Froerer.
POINT IV
COMBE AS OWNER OF THE PROPERTY WAS CHARGED WITH CONSTRUCTIVE
NOTICE OF THE EASEMENT AND THEREFORE CANNOT COMPLAIN
THAT OTHER PARTIES SHOULD HAVE INFORMED HIM AS TO THE
QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF HIS PROPERTY BEFORE ALLOWING HIM
TO ENTER INTO THIS TRANSACTION
Combe takes the position that all other parties and
their attorneys should be insurers of his obligations.
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This

position is untenable.
and were

Combes were the owners of the property

charged with knowledge of its quality and status.

Crompton v. Jensen, 1 P.2d 242 (Utah, 1931), Flying Diamond Oil
Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 109 Utah Adv. Rpt. 11 at P. 18 (Utah,
1989).

Combe presented no evidence that he advised Froerer of

the condition of the property or that he requested Froerer to
perform a title search on the property before closing.

In fact,

the evidence showed that Combe completed the closing at his own
instance by obtaining signatures on the documents without even
telling Froerer that the transaction had closed.

Since Combe had

knowledge of the status of his property pursuant to Utah law and
could understand the contract which he signed, he cannot now
complain that it required an unencumbered title to be conveyed.
POINT V
COMBES' CLAIMS AGAINST FROERER ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS
Combes

allege

that

Froerer

committed

negligence

in

December, 1979, when Froerer allowed the transaction to close
without protecting Combes interest.

Combes claim is either one

of negligence or one of breach of contract.

Combe presented no

evidence to show that there was a written contract in existence
between Combe and Froerer which would have allowed a six year
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statute of limitations therefore 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated
1953 (as amended) governs.

This statute requires Combes to bring

their action within four years from the date of the alleged
negligence.

The Combes did not bring this action until August,

1986. Combes did not allege fraud or mispresentation/ therefore
this claim against Froerer must fail as untimely filed.
CONCLUSION
Combes' claims against attorney Froerer for negligence
must be dismissed because Combe never denied that their own
attorney,

Paul

Kunz,

documents in question.

reviewed,

modified

and

approved

the

If there was malpractice, Combe should

look to his own attorney, Paul Kunz.

If Froerer wcis in fact

representing both clients, then Froerer had no duty to protect
Combe in the manner asserted in his amended cross-claim.
asserts

that

Froerer

was

negligent

in

withholding

Combe

material

information from them, but then failed to introduce any evidence
to show that Combe even met with Froerer before the closing.

No

party requested that title work be completed before the closing
and no party relied upon any title work that was accomplished.
Combe can show no damages as a result of any action
taken by Froerer and the Combes failed to file their claijn
against Froerer within the applicable limitation provided by Utah
Statute.

The District Court was therefore correct in ruling as a
18

matter of law that Combe had no claim against Froerer either as
an attorney or as an abstractor of title and properly entered
summary judgment dismissing Combes' amended cross-claim.
This Court should do likewise as Combe can present no
legal basis nor facts upon which he can sustain a cause of
action.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of July, 1989.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

THEODORE E. KANELL
Attorney for Respondent
Robert Froerer
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /Q
four

true

RESPONDENT

and

correct

FROERER

copies
was

of

mailed,

following:
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
John P. Ashton and Erik Strindberg
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellants Combes
JACK L. SCHOENHALS
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Attorney for Respondents
Breuer and Harrison
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST
David E. West
1300 Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent
Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund
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BRIEF
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